It’s sad that there were 2 fatal crashes recently and I’m not supporting Boeing in any way. But it’s been stated there could be some software conflict about the angle of attack and the autopilot computer compensates and dropped the nose down which causes the steep dive crash.

But the Supermax 8 was introduced in January 2016 - how was it able to survive for 3 years before these first crashes? And why weren’t there more crashes around the same time period as the recent two?

Could have been a previously unmentioned software update

I read Boeing made a few different versions of control systems, the ones that crashed were the ones with the minimum control system to reduce cost. Combined with flight crews who were probably not up to western standards. But it could be some BS from a internet pilot.

Pilot error I think, may be a problem with the auto pilot and angle of attack computer glitch. If the pilot were properly trained the way to solve the problem is to turn off auto pilot or the auto trim. There is a large trim wheel between the pilot seats with big marks on it. If the trim is running wild a pilot should notice this wheel spinning resolve the problem by turning of the auto pilot or auto trim. I am not an ATR pilot but fly an older Cessna 210. In this aircraft there is a switch on the yoke to turn off auto pilot, I'm sure it is a less complicate aircraft, but the is a way to turn off the auto pilot almost instantly. A more well trained pilot was dead heading on one of the planes the day before and recognized the problem and was able to help the regular flight crew save the plane, however when they landed they made no mention of the problem to the maintenance crews. Just my humble opinion.

One would think a natural reaction of a pilot would be to disengage autopilot and try to regain control of the plane in a timly manner and go from there.

Here's a link that helps explain the MCAS and it's effects:
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-...eristics-augmentation-system-mcas-jt610/

However, in the Ethiopian Airlines situation, the pilots did follow Boeing protocol and turned-off teh system, but the plane still creased. This leads to speculation that there might be some other "bugs"hidden in the software.

This always scares me whenever I see “would like to update”

No, I don’t need any new emojis.

The 737 is a legendary airplane but its been remade into versions it wasn't originally intended to be. They keep putting larger engines on it, so this causes them to be mounted more forward of the wing and the already short landing gear and means the plane is more tricky in a stall situation. This is because they plane will pitch up when you add power. So if the plane is stalling you must get the nose down, then add power. this can cause and issue with elevator authority, if the plane is in a stall. meaning the elevator doesn't have the airflow anymore to control pitch angle. So what they do to fix this is move the entire rear horizonatal wings, not just the elevators. This is controlled by a jack screw that will move the entire rear stablizers. basically grabbing alot more air, doing so. this is the leading theory on why the planes crashed. its called the MCAS system. watch this video for a great explanation.

A Cessna 210 is less complicated then a 737? Some real experts around here.

surprised another pilot would jump to conclusions about pilot error. I even caveated my comments basically with this is what is in the news or this is what they are looking at. no one knows what happened. Also the video I posted the guy who is an actual 737 pilot explains when and how the auto pilot is turned off and under what circumstances. he also explains how the elevator is totally ineffective if the system moved the entire surface of the horizontal stabilizer. I think its reasonable that given the right cirumstances and right after takeoff, if the that jack screw went nuts that there wasn't a manual way of correcting it fast enough.

Poorly designed system and sub-par pilots. Pretty simple. If crap isn't working TURN IT OFF or pull the breakers.

Not sure of all the details, but the Ethiopian pilots apparently followed Boeing's instructions. see: https://www.wsj.com/articles/ethiop...ps-to-disable-737-max-system-11554263276

This may indicate either there are other issues or the certification protocol missed some points.

They failed to disconnect the system, either at the on/off switches just under the throttle quadrants or failing that, pull the offending circuit breakers. Apparently US airlines had the same incidents occur to them and they handled it with no problems.

It wasn't so much pilot error as poor training. Jorge is right. You are trained to automatically do certain things when things malfunction. You don't have time to think about it or look it up in the manual. First class airlines have much more in-depth training programs while some airlines do the minimum. The more I learn about airlines, the shorter the list of who I'd fly becomes.

The industry is trying to take operator skill out of the equation with automation to meet the pilot demand. Why is everybody with the exception of skilled pilots shocked that an accident like this can happen?

The safety analysis Boeing sent to the FAA reported that the MCAS could only move the plane’s horizontal tail 0.6 degrees
(out of a physical maximum of a little less than five degrees). But during later flight tests, Boeing discovered that 0.6 degrees
of movement wasn’t enough to avert a high speed stall. Boeing eventually increased the limit to 2.5 degrees.

Despite quadrupling the amount that the MCAS could move the plane’s tail, Boeing never updated the documents it sent to the FAA.
FAA engineers only found out about the change after the Lion Air crash, when Boeing sent a notice to airlines explaining how the system worked.

“The FAA believed the airplane was designed to the 0.6 limit, and that’s what the foreign regulatory authorities thought, too,”
an FAA engineer told the Times. “It makes a difference in your assessment of the hazard involved.”

******

The safety analysis that Boeing and the FAA collaborated on concluded that a faulty activation of MCAS under extreme flight conditions
would be a “hazardous failure”—meaning it could cause serious or fatal injuries to a few passengers,
The analysis stopped short of the “catastrophic failure” classification that predicts a total loss and many deaths.

Major U.S. airlines like developing world airlines, skimped by not investing in the relevant 737 MAX simulators.

however, simulator training does not provide precise duplication of what pilots can encounter in a real crisis,
so the value of simulator training is somewhat limited.

A primary selling-marketing strategy of Boeing was based on telling air carriers that their pilots would not require
any such additional simulator training and certification for the 737 MAX.



re: 'western Standard'....?....fact of the matter is Not all western pilots are trained to the same std. for 737 MAX.



Except that turning off Auto Pilot does not deactivate MACS.

MACS can still continue to kick in when an aircraft is operated under manual control.
A pilot can counteract the dive by pulling up on the control column, but MACS will kick in again after 10 second intervals.
Lion Air showed that the aircraft oscillated 26 times in the struggle between pilot input and MACS.

Simulators isn't all of it. Pilots are constantly getting tech bulletins. They describe incidents and how things were remedied. The manufacturers aren't trying to take the pilot out of it. When things go wrong, the pilots are hand flying. The First Officer of the Ethiopian flight had only 200 hours of flight time. That's terrible.

This has nothing to do with the autopilot. You turn off the automatic trim.

Best you take that up with Switch who made the claim, not me.

my post is clear in that they are seperate independent systems.

I would agree to this.

Came out today, info from the so called black boxes had the pilots doing exactly what they were suppose to. Low altitude didn't give them a chance.

Phil

No. Not exactly. They did the initial step correctly but then apparently turned the system back on when they couldn't fly the jet. Why you would do that I have no idea.

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/e...eps-to-disable-737-max-system-2019-04-03

A lot of good discussion on the mishap on the aviation boards from informed people and it hasn't changed my opinion that this issue is one of training, systems knowledge and airmanship.

I also learned something knew but not unexpected, that every aircraft has different flying characteristics and thus behave differently. For example in the Max 8, the way to recover from a stall or avoiding one after 'bitching betty" or rudder/stick shaker kicks in, is to immediately start trimming nose and stick down BEFORE adding power. In the airplane I flew it was a simultaneous event. Also, while TRIM DISCONNECT does not disable MCAS, the two switches directly below the throttles do and that is what should have been done. Also, regarding the comment about making aircraft more and more hands off, that is the route AIRBUS took years ago (and it's still costing lives), whereas Boeing still gives the PIC a lot more reliance on his skills as it should be. It's all about "train how you are going to fight". In Naval Aviation, we practiced stalls of every kind, departure, in short, the full maneuvering envelope of the airframe, virtually every time we went up. Airline pilots just don't have that luxury.

Here's one analysis of the situation:

https://leehamnews.com/2019/04/03/et302-used-the-cut-out-switches-to-stop-mcas/#more-29790

I have several friends who flew military and commercial. The agree that low altitude limits your options (time to recover); one friend stalled at 72,000', but had time to recover!

Well nosbit, Sherlock. Altitude, like speed is life. Just finished a gent talking about it on the news. it turns out, the KNUCKLEHEADS in the cockpit, turned the damned box back on FOUR TIMES after it malfunctioned. FOUR TIMES. That right there tells me a LOT>

Well, reading the link, it appears that they turned it back on because it was impossible to trim manually.

Pitch (& roll) trim are independent of the MCAS. The problem is, with the MCAS engaged, available pitch trim is very limited. I wasn't in the cockpit so we really won't know until the full report comes out AND vetted by the FAA and Boeing, but ostensibly, with pitch trim disconnected, you can manually trim with the big trim wheels on the side of the throttle quadrant. The huge turd in the punch bowl with MCAS, if you wait too long and the system (MCAS) has trimmed nose down and at low altitude, you're screwed (From what I saw nose down pitch was at 6 degrees which is YUGE and your trim tab only gives you ~1 degree. In the airplane I flew pitch trim was electric only, so it the pitch trim failed, you could still fly the jet with no issues, although coming aboard, could get a bit sporty. Suffice it to sa, if they kept turning it back on and every time it came on it kept trimming nose down, well we know the rest.

How many angle of attack sensors do commercial aircraft typically have? The one article I looked at, that I can't remember the name of unfortunately, made it sound like that the MCAS system for the 738 Max took all of its data from one angle of attack sensor?

EDIT: I should have typed 'from a SINGLE angle of attack sensor.'
Would that make sense to any of you aviators?

It has two aoa probes. The MCAS only reads from the port (pilots) side.

Interesting! Thank you.

It seems a pretty simple fix with a software update , a cutoff switch , and a little pilot training. MACS needs to be limited in its trim range and able to be permanently disengaged with a flick of a switch so power to the trim isn’t cut. Pilots need to be trained to recognize the issue and cut MACS off. Boeing screwed the pooch by giving MACS too much ability to trim , not providing a MACS cutout that didn’t cut power to the stabilizer , and hiding the systems nature from the pilots.
All this talk about how the aircraft is unstable and therefore unsafe is ridiculous. The slight nose up from the forward engine mounting means little as long as you are aware of this. Pilots need to trim their aircraft due to weight distribution and atmospherics every flight and compensating for the natural forward lift is no different than trimming the aircraft for weight and atmospherics.
The killer in this situation is that the pilots cut the power back on to the stabilizer to be able to get the stabilizer down but were unaware that MACS was going to throw it back up again in ten seconds. If they had turned the power back on for only a few seconds to get the stabilizer down and then cut it off again before MACS could intervene again they probably wouldn’t have crashed. MACS made it so the pilots couldn’t fly the aircraft by hand.
It’s Boeing’s fault but the MAX8 is a good platform that was made unsafe by Boeing trying to make it seem exactly like the 737NG when it wasn’t.

My question would be why did the MACS system decide that the aircraft was approaching a stall condition. Or was it just a bad reading from the AOA probe (which IIRC was written up in the maintenance log on a prior flight).

The two aircraft that crashed only had one sensor, the foreign registered aircraft only had one , while U.S. registered aircraft had two basically a back-up.

Phil

Another bad decision by Boeing to use only one AOA indicator instead of two and a warning of conflicting AOA readings. The entire MACS is a bad idea born out of regulation avoidance. If they weren’t trying to avoid pilot certification training costs for airlines and aircraft recertification costs and time there wouldn’t even be a MACS.

That was what I was wondering about, why not have 2 or, even, 3 AOA sensors and have the MACS read all of them? I realize that would be expensive, but I can't help but wonder if the redundancy in taking readings from 3 independent sensors and then making a decision as far as a stall condition be more reliable?

Again, I am no pilot or aeronautical engineer, so thanks for indulging my(perhaps silly) questions.

I also blame the FAA a little. The differences between the 737NG and the MAX 8 shouldn’t have triggered a full aircraft and pilot certification so Boeing wouldn’t have tried too hard to cover what are in reality small differences to avoid triggering huge compliance costs. The FAA cooperated with Boeing on covering up the differences instead of making Boeing do some reasonable testing for a modification of the certification of the 737 NG for the MAX 8 and then a truthful and transparent flight manual. In the end the ultimate responsibility rest with Boeing.

What the link said is that above a certain speed, it is impossible to trim manually. They kept turning it on so they could use the trim tabs on the wheel. Then MCAS would kick in and they would be right back to where they were.

The aircraft I worked on over thirty years ago, IIRC the port AOA probe drove the pilots display while the starboard probe fed the copilot's instruments. Pitot tubes were set up the same. Both were independent systems.

My understanding is that both crashed aircraft had two AOA sensors.

Of the two sensors (on the nose) of the Ethiopian,, one began giving readings nearly 60 degrees different from its counterpart.

Lion Air had a problematic sensor worked on by Florida based aerospace co.



When initially released, MCAS only relied on a single AOA sensor.
There are multiple AOA sensors in a 737 Max 8.


Boeing sells (2) MCAS upgrades that weren’t installed on either the Lion Air jet or the Ethiopian Airlines craft;

. The first is the ability to compare data from more than one AOA sensor via a display that shown readings
from both at the same time. The second a ‘disagree light’ n that activates when contradictory data is
received from both sensors. Either might have alerted the pilots that something was wrong with the MCAS system specifically.

Boeing will now make the disagree light standard on all 737 Max 8, in addition to software updates.
After the due software changes, MCAS will be updated to check both sensors and to disable itself if there is “meaningful disagreement”
between the two.



even the lowest experience bordering on dumbaZZ PP would know that...as would some half savvy types who have never
piloted in their life.....but thanks for sharing.

Neighbor is a 737 pilot for South West. Haven't seen him to ask his opinion but it seems fairly obvious it's a case of inexperienced pilots and a sub-par airline putting them in command.

Not that the plane is perfect, but more experienced pilots seem to have handled similar situations without the catastrophic results.


Ethiopian airlines? WTF? Probably gotta split one lousy peanut with the whole fuggin' row on a trans ocean flight.....

Well, it seems that Boeing's behind-the-scenes efforts to control costs at all-cost might have played a role.
see: https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/20...px.cnn/video/playlists/around-the-world/

.....

unless, the airline paid $11,000 for the optional dual aoa probes feeding into the MAS system. Boeing also offered a cargo hold fire suppression system (not standard). Cut-rate airlines often do all possible to minimize costs by not opting for additional equipment even if it enhances safety.

And yet Ethiopian airlines own a few(not sure how many?) Boeing 787s and those things can't be cheap?

no doubt that played a huge part.. Along with third world pilots.,,,,

All this third world talk. Ethiopian airlines has a tier 1 rating from the FAA which means it is allowed to and does operate in the US. It flies in the EU as well. It has a good safety rating by any measure and might be even more impressive considering how much flying it does in Africa where equipment and conditions at airports are likely to be less than great.

They're the best African airline. When I told my brother that, he said "that makes them the best of the worst".

Whenever Boeing "improves" an airplane model, it attempts to minimize the new stuff the airline has to learn as much as possible. This makes the new version attractive to airlines already flying the old.

In the case of the 737 Max8,the only additional training recommended was a 1-hour session on an iPad. Id didn't cover the CMAS system. It should have.

Remotely taken over by an outside source by over-riding software!!

Already proven that it can be done!

Third World pilots? Boeing and others have touted Ethiopian as the best run (and trained) airline in Africa, eclipsing South African Airlines. BTW, Ethiopian has a 737-Max simulator, the only one in African and at least one European airlines sends their pilots to Ethiopian for training and certification.

Boeing, accepting the fact that "We own the problem" (Boeing CEO) and that the problem now appears to be larger than thought a week ago, is contemplating a reduction in production (now 52/month - they hd planed to increase this to 57/month). It seems that (among other things) they are running out of storage space at the Renton Airport.
see: https://seekingalpha.com/news/34487...owdown-scenarios-reuters?dr=1#email_link

I do hope they solve this issue quickly as I am a Boeing shareholder and don't want the stock to get lower (now down to about $395/share).

A statement from Dennis Mulenberg today (Boeing CEO):

"We at Boeing are sorry for the lives lost in the recent 737 MAX accidents. These tragedies continue to weigh heavily on our hearts and minds, and we extend our sympathies to the loved ones of the passengers and crew on board Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302. All of us feel the immense gravity of these events across our company and recognize the devastation of the families and friends of the loved ones who perished.

The full details of what happened in the two accidents will be issued by the government authorities in the final reports, but, with the release of the preliminary report of the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 accident investigation, it’s apparent that in both flights the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, known as MCAS, activated in response to erroneous angle of attack information.

The history of our industry shows most accidents are caused by a chain of events. This again is the case here, and we know we can break one of those chain links in these two accidents. As pilots have told us, erroneous activation of the MCAS function can add to what is already a high workload environment. It’s our responsibility to eliminate this risk. We own it and we know how to do it.

From the days immediately following the Lion Air accident, we’ve had teams of our top engineers and technical experts working tirelessly in collaboration with the Federal Aviation Administration and our customers to finalize and implement a software update that will ensure accidents like that of Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 never happen again.

We’re taking a comprehensive, disciplined approach, and taking the time, to get the software update right. We’re nearing completion and anticipate its certification and implementation on the 737 MAX fleet worldwide in the weeks ahead. We regret the impact the grounding has had on our airline customers and their passengers.

This update, along with the associated training and additional educational materials that pilots want in the wake of these accidents, will eliminate the possibility of unintended MCAS activation and prevent an MCAS-related accident from ever happening again.

We at Boeing take the responsibility to build and deliver airplanes to our airline customers and to the flying public that are safe to fly, and can be safely flown by every single one of the professional and dedicated pilots all around the world. This is what we do at Boeing.

We remain confident in the fundamental safety of the 737 MAX. All who fly on it—the passengers, flight attendants and pilots, including our own families and friends—deserve our best. When the MAX returns to the skies with the software changes to the MCAS function, it will be among the safest airplanes ever to fly.

We’ve always been relentlessly focused on safety and always will be. It’s at the very core of who we are at Boeing. And we know we can always be better. Our team is determined to keep improving on safety in partnership with the global aerospace industry and broader community. It’s this shared sense of responsibility for the safety of flight that spans and binds us all together.

I cannot remember a more heart-wrenching time in my career with this great company. When I started at Boeing more than three decades ago, our amazing people inspired me. I see how they dedicate their lives and extraordinary talents to connect, protect, explore and inspire the world — safely. And that purpose and mission has only grown stronger over the years.

We know lives depend on the work we do and that demands the utmost integrity and excellence in how we do it. With a deep sense of duty, we embrace the responsibility of designing, building and supporting the safest airplanes in the skies. We know every person who steps aboard one of our airplanes places their trust in us.

Together, we’ll do everything possible to earn and re-earn that trust and confidence from our customers and the flying public in the weeks and months ahead.

Again, we’re deeply saddened by and are sorry for the pain these accidents have caused worldwide. Everyone affected has our deepest sympathies.


Signature



Dennis Muilenburg
Chairman, President and CEO
The Boeing Company

djs: Owning a sim means nothing. Airlines rent sim time from each other all the time but they use their own instructors. What does an Ethiopian instructor know about KLM, Air France, or British Air procedures? Maybe a check ride performed by a pilot designee approved by the Ethiopian FAA gives you a warm and fuzzy but it doesn't mean much to me.

Hell, its all just Boeing cutting corners trying to make up for all the losses in in the KC-46 program,,, and their many failed attempts to BS the Air Force in to accepting it and they will fix all the problems later.

Surprised their stock isn't down 30-40 %, except that the tanker problems or the latest refusal to accept hasn't really been in the front pages.


Phil

The Ethiopian Copilot had 200 hours total flight experience. That is flat ridiculous. They put a damned student in there.

Yes they had a Max sim. Want to guess how much time the captain logged on it?

Like I said, the plane ain't perfect, Boeing has some fault, but Ethipoian Air and those pilots killed those people.

I don't claim to know a lot (anything?) about the technical aspects of flying an airplane. I do have a friend who has flown a lot for a lot of years. He recently sent me his thoughts on this issue which I have copied from his email and will post below for those of you with much more knowledge of this stuff than I to peruse:

Boy, your timing is superb concerning the Max's 8 situation. I don't know much about Civilian aircraft ( the USAF always took care of that stuff) but ... I think there is a lot going on behind that magic curtain - Dorothy, back at Boeing SEA-TAC and the FAA.

I retired from the NYANG in a "Lockheed" HC-130 (ski-model) flying "workhorse". Since the "original" C-130 took flight in 1954 - they have been almost completely updated, modified and re-certificated several times but maintained some basic characteristics. My 1st aircraft was a General Dynamics' F-111 ( the first "Swing-wing Fighter) that resulted in the F-14 that Tom Cruise made famous in Top Gun. The F-111 maintained most of the original layouts/characteristics. Shortly after the F-111 was grounded - I stood under the wing of my first Boeing (707-type) aircraft.

OK - I've established my history .. During my "Original" - first ever "sit in the seat" flying session for the (heavily modified Boeing 707) Q-Model KC-135 (Habu - SR-71 Package) - the Flight Instructor (from Boeing) specifically told us/me; "once you are familiar with this Boeing aircraft - you should be able to jump in the seat of "ANY" Boeing made aircraft from WWII to present..." He said; it won't be pretty but in an emergency (with help via radios) you will be able to find just about everything and all "yoke" driven Boeings are similar." Fortunately; I never had to find out. But, he said they've tried to maintain the same basic blood lines and familiarity. I was fond of the Boeing from the 1st moment. I still own Boeing stock.. I bought my Grandson his 1st (framed) Boeing Stock Certificate.

If you don't want to read a rant - delete this now. The more I learn about the Max the more I hate it. I'm a huge Boeing fan but I do believe the millenials have made it up inside the corporate structure of Boeing. Here are the facts as gleaned from an unnamed retired AA (American Airlines; 757, 67 and 787) Captain / Retired USAF Res. (Rockwell built) B-1B Pilot who is the Brother of a 40+ year friend.

The Max is a redesign of the 737. Boeing wanted a longer range midsize jet but didn't want to spend bazillions getting a new design certified. If they "updated" a current design they self certify the AC with no interference from the FAA. Step one, needed more powerful engines. Here's where the aeronautical fun begins.

Standard 737 could not take bigger engines, the current ones (now, in a new location) practically darn near dragged on the tarmac. So they; extended the landing gear, moved the engines closer to the fuselage which also moves the engines forward (swept wing). OK; CG and centerline of thrust - are severely compromised. Engineers knew this of course. They've created by their own admission an UNSTABLE AIRCRAFT!!! To get around this issue the computer genius' came up with MCAS system, never used in any Boeing aircraft. MCAS - Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System. Personal note here, I wouldn't want to fly any plane with the word augmentation in it.

Pilots have to enter data into the MCAS prior to departure. Weight, fuel, baggage, cargo, elevation, temperature, etc. Weight and balance on MAX is very critical, especially when you realize the aircraft is already inherently UNSTABLE. Think of it this way, the engines are mounted below the wings and centerline of the fuselage. The MAX engines are insanely powerful. You fist the throttles on this puppy in flight and it will nose right up, especially if the load is light.

The MCAS system automatically controls thrust, trim, pitch and roll. Since the plane design is inherently unstable Boeing decided to forgo a single AP (auto pilot) disconnect because flying the MAX manually is dangerous and only the best test pilots could handle it. Pilots today are no longer stick & rudder, they all are gear up AP on, gear down AP off.

Even then most pilots fly AP all the way to the threshold. Tons of youtube vids showing them coming over the numbers and calling out auto throttle off. Expecting a crew to hand fly the new MAX when they rarely if ever hand fly in the first place is a recipe for disaster. Thus, Boeing Engineers and techies decided in order for pilots to disable the MCAS system they have to do it in three steps, hopefully rather quickly,,,,.....

And get this gem from an actual Boeing Engineer, "Pilots entering incorrect data into the MCAS prior to flight could force the aircraft into a ten second dive in flight! WHAT??? Now there's a great feature that sent me over the edge. WTF??? Make a mistake at the gate and the goddam plane could go into a TEN SECOND DIVE???

Latest news tonight, Boeing claims they will have a "software fix" within a couple of weeks.... Fly by wire, pilots don't hand fly, relying more and more on computers. The MAX has more than one million lines of computer code! Chew on that my former KC-135/Boeing 707 Crewmember . So, after my rant here it must be said I could be absolutely wrong on the cause however it's hard to blame the pilots for training they never received.

This is not new: Imagine you pull back on the yoke but the nose goes down, or you throttle up and it goes to idle, you go to idle, it goes to full, on and on. I don't like fly by wire. Remember the SAS (Scandinavian Airlines) pilot that crashed an MD-80 in Scandinavia not too many years ago. Lost both engines on takeoff and dead sticked into a snowy field. They all lived but some major injuries. Investigators blamed the Captain. Said he overboosted the engines and blew them up on takeoff. Captain said they had a fire warning and one engine quit. Shortly after the other engine ran away and grenaded itself. It took 18 months and a very good investigator to figure out what really happened.

(Another - for instance): There was clear ice on the plane. Captain had the plane de-iced just minutes before departure. The ice was thought to be over an inch thick and the ground crew missed it cuz it was clear ice and dark. Upon rotation and liftoff the ice came off, right into the engines. One compressor lost blades and ate itself on fire. The other engine - the Capt was holding/maintaining control on takeoff power but it kept going to full throttle.

He said he would pull the throttle back so as not to overboost but it would go right back to full throttle. The engine compressor stalled and ate itself. The Captains career was ruined. Turns out MD installed a software system that controls engine thrust in an emergency. Climbing out on one engine the puter was sensing too close to a stall so it throttled up! SAS nor any of its pilots were aware of the system being on their newest MD-80 models. Capt never flew again, said the entire process ruined him mentally and he never ever wants to fly again. Discovery did a program about it and him.

We are not hearing it all. I'm not selling my Boeing stock (yet) but waiting for another 10-15% drop to buy more. Boeing will survive (they are just that good) but the FAA and Boeing Execs will have some explaining to do. The Max 8 & 9 are far more than just a easily "modified" 737... I believe they should be a complete "re-certification" - maybe considered a totally new aircraft (from ground up).

I can't believe you can't (with 1 hand to the pedestal) quickly disconnect from AP and manually re-trim - taking over - hand-flying the plane as we were lead to believe we could "with every Boeing aircraft built since WWII..." (frigging millennial-type computer - total fly-by-wire crap.).. jp

1. US (and European carriers) also use and experienced this issue, yet they were able to recover.
2. Two (2) third world airlines did not.
3. Pilots turned the fuggin' MCAS on three more times (for a total of four) every time it went tits up (Hint, in the flying business, if sheit is giving you problems, you turn it off and the problems GO AWAY, LEAVE IT OFF until you land. Kept me alive...

Full power into the ground. Still not a reason why just some guessing.

Ethiopian recently received the simulator in January, the captain had not yet done time in the simulator,
but was due for such toward the end of March.

but as I already pointed out in an earlier post, the sim is limited in what it can provide, training scenarios
are possible where MACS provides inputs,
but the sim cannot precisely replicate a real life crisis involving MACS.




Why the FAA , EU, rich Gulf states, Israel, Japan .. trust Ethiopian air captains I don't know, its evident the pilot bashers on this here campfire
would have people think they have more experience with them and would advise otherwise.

For those interested in the flight graphs of Lion Air and Ethiopian;
https://images.app.goo.gl/o2oUbw75tKH2YhTLA

Once again, according to one of the links they didn’t keep turning the power trim back on because they were stupid, they did it because the trim was forcing the nose down and at the speed they were going, they could not manually trim the aircraft. They needed the electrical power to do it. So the MCAS would force the nose down and they would turn it off. Then they trim was stuck and they could not move it manually. So, they would turn it on and trim it up, then the MCAS would take over again and force the nose down. Rinse, wash, and repeat. All of this taking place at low altitude and going up and down like a yo-yo.

The KC-135 is not a modified 707. It's a variant of the -80.

Wrong. Manual trim doesn't mean that the pilots are manually moving cables and using muscle power to trim the aircraft. It just means that they are making the trim decisions and not letting the computer do it on its own. The MCAS depends on the AOA to decide when to intercede. If you know the AOA sensors are giving erroneous readings, you manually turn off the auto stabilization switches. Once that's done, the MCAS can't do anything.

first thing was the aoa sensor failed on both of these flights. in the recent one, mcas def made it very complicated to recover, that and the low altitude few minutes after takeoff. the crew probably made a few mistakes (pilot error?), but they didn't seem to have the background to deal with mcas (not pilot error)

Nope, you’re dead wrong. The circuit breaker CUTS ALL ELETRICAL POWER to the jack screw. You then trim the 737 with a trim wheel that MANUALLY turns the jack screw.

Boeing planned 737 production, now 52/month was to rise to 57/month, but today was cut to 42/month starting in mid-April. this will certainty cause a back-up in the supplier chain.

if you are referring to the Ethiopian flight, then you are wrong. The FO did indeed manually crank the stab, but the speed and attitude rendered this virtually impossible to do, that was well into th 6 minute flight and it is 'assumed' the crew re-activated the stab. that function is not recorded on the FDR, but could be confirmed if they find the switch

And MCAS is not an auto-pilot, so it can’t be turned off. If there is electric power to the jack screw, it kicks in no matter what if the computer thinks it needs to.

it doesn't run while on auto pilot, either, or with flaps

It should not be that difficult to run a system integrating two AOA sensors and having an "AOA Plausibility Test." If the sensors disagree by X amount, the system outputs a disable command to MCAS. And then you make sure its all covered in the flight manual. That's just my own rather uninformed perspective, though.

I have to wonder why Boeing did not extend the rear section of the fuselage to counter the relocation of the engines to give the aircraft better balance characteristics. Woulda made room for more seats, too. Then again...if I had the answers I wouldn't be doing what I do.

Yeah, it does. If there is power to the trim, it is on.

You are declaring that there is no provision for manual trim.

correct, he is wrong

The bottom line is that Boeing did not, at any cost, want pilots to be required more simulator time to switch to the super max. That’s it in a nut shell.

Have you guys even read about this? You have the electric trim tabs on the yoke/wheel. Then you have a manual trim wheel on either side of the center console. You trim the airplane with the electric trim buttons. If there is a runaway trim, you throw the breaker that cuts power to the jack screw and use the manual trim wheels on the consol.

MCAS is not autopilot. It is always on. It trims the aircraft when it senses that the AOA is to high and might cause a stall in any configuration whether the pilot is flying or autopilot is engaged. The only way to stop MCAS from trimming the aircraft if it thinks it needs to is to throw the breaker and turn off power to the jack screw. Then, you use the wheel to manually trim the aircraft.

So you think the trim wheel does not run the jacks crew electrically. What do you think operates the trim of there's no power at all to those jack screws?.

There's so much crap flying around that I give up.

You can always pull the circuit breaker to turn off an electrical system.

One of the first things you learn is to cross check your instruments. That's where Boeing F*^$%^ up if anywhere. You have redundant angle of attack indicators (electrical) and redundant airspeed and rate of climb indicators (pneumatic). You don't manipulate flight controls based on the one that disagrees.

Yes, that is exactly what it does. You don’t use the trim wheels unless you turn off the power to the jack screw.

You have trim buttons on the yoke/wheel that you trim the aircraft with when using the electric system.

So what operates the trim tabs? Cables?

edited to be nice

It is a fricking button that runs the electric motor that turns the jack screw.

After the Lion Air crash -

Boeing informed operators MACS AOA error can occur only during manual flight control
MACS can activate automatically when Auto-Pilot is OFF.

Boeing recommended pilots use the electric trim buttons (on the yoke), to reverse the
downward stabiliser trim effect of an active MACS system.

MACS will reactivate within 5 seconds of the electric trim buttons being released, if the
AOA sensor is still reading too high.

Failing that, the pilot can deactivate MACS, and apply the manual hand crank wheels
which drive a mechanical cable system to set/adjust the trim.

https://images.app.goo.gl/X2VdrqLYxDb6sFqZ9


Bingo.



Yoke electric trim buttons can somewhat counter the effects of MACS, according to Boeing.

Right, but as you noted, they don’t turn it off. It starts back again after five seconds.

I wonder if the Ethiopian pilots disconnected the auto throttles. That is one of the memory items for runaway trim I saw explained in a pilot video.

There are also several reports of MCAS (or something similar that Boeing hasn’t told anyone about) with autopilot engaged.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.theatlantic.com/amp/article/585034/

You did not understand my question. But then again I did not understand how elevator trim operates on the 737 in the first place and I was operating on a faulty assumption. Now that I've looked closely I see that there are no "trim tabs" per se, but rather the entire stabilizer moves.

The buttons on the yoke operate the actuator, or MCAS can operate the actuator. In the event of an actuator failure, the trim wheel can be used to trim the elevator.

my understanding is that (based on preliminary findings)

Ethiopian pilots intially disconnected MACS and attempted to use the manual cable wheels to trim the troubled aircraft.
however, ..due to air speed and extreme angle of the stabilisers (resultant airflow forces acting on them) they
could not manually trim the aircraft,..They then turned the electronics back ON, and repeatedly employed the control yoke
electric trim buttons,
but this put them in a protracted tussle with MACS, causing the aircraft to oscillate four(4x) times before impact.

They were [literally] caught between a rock and a hard place.

.
Prior to both 737 MAX crashes, US and EU regulators were aware that flight simulations indicated the
yoke electric trim buttons could NOT keep 737 MAX properly trimmed under certain conditions, including those
of the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes.


A European Aviation and Space Agency(EASA) document said that after flight testing, FAA's Transport Airplane Directorate,
which oversees design approvals and modifications, was concerned whether the 737 MAX system complied with regulations
because the thumb trim buttons could not control trim on their own in all conditions.

FAA declined to comment on the European document.
A trim-related "equivalent level of safety" (ELOS) memorandum listed in its 737 MAX certification document is not available
on the FAA website.

The FAA also declined to provide it to media outlets.



Boeing just recently confirmed a second software problem. which FAA ordered be rectified –

it is seperate to MACS, but pertains to flaps and other flight stabilisation hardware. and is classified as 'critical to flight safety',

it is the reason there has been delay in the projected time period in which Boeing said it would have things rectified.
Boeing initially planned to submit fixes for MACS to the FAA for review last week.
FAA said it now expects to receive the final package of software "over the coming weeks".

Boeing called the new issue "relatively minor" and did not offer details of how it affects the flight-control system.

One aviation financial analyst is suggesting the problem is larger than Boeing has admitted and the 737-MAX fleet might be grounded for 6 months. While the MCAS software fix is relatively straight forward, the interface between this software patch and over--riding the jackscrew system is more complicated. Boeing is reducing production form 52/month to 42/month and Renton Airport is filling up with stored aircraft.

When the Boeing 737 (100 & 200) was originally designed, it was designed around the P&W JT-8D engine which fit nicely below the wing; shorter landing gear allowed for a lower fuselage floor height. As the larger-diameter fan CFM CF-56 engines were designed for 737 fitment (300, 400, 400 and 600 models), the ground clearance became an issue (due to the shorter landing gear length), so the engine was moved forward and higher on the wing. Even this required the oil pump and alternator being moved from the bottom of the engine to the side, thus the oval shape of the engine cowling - compare frontal views of the Boeing 737 and the Airbus A-320). With the even-larger-fan diameter of the engine for the MAX series, the engine was moved further forward and higher on the wing (even this required lengthening the nose gear strut by 10"). Apparently the relocation of the engine causes the nose to rise (increased angle-of-attack) and the MCAS system was designed to mitigate this.

Boeing engineers were under great pressure to develop the MAX series to counter-act the sales success of the Airbus A-320 NEO (New Engine Option) and under instruction to minimize changes.

Of course, all this begs the question - Shouldn't a commercial aircraft be designed to be inherently as stall-proof as possible and not have software fixes to counter-act a design shortfall?

I also read that Boeing originally designed it and certified it to move the trim a maximum of 2.5 degrees. But in testing they figured out that 2.5 degrees wasn’t enough and modified to allow maximum travel. BUT THEY NEVER WENT BACK AND RECERTIFIED THE CHANGE NOR DID THEY MENTION IT IN ANY IF THE FLIGHT MANUALS.

What it all boils down to is that there is more than just simple neglect on Boeings part that resulted in the deaths of 346 people. That's fact... also fact is that Boeing knowingly and deliberately marketed the aircraft knowing that it had flaws that could easily cause crashes that would cause loss of life. To the point that they (Boeing) tried to sneak through patches and fixes nearly from the start without notifying its customers of any problems, plans.to fix, or recommendation to ground the planes.

Anybody that thinks Boeing is going to come out of this unscathed is going to have a rude awakening. And unlike what another mentioned, it is nothing like the Tylenol case where the manufacture had nothing to do with the products failure or cause of death.

The deaths are wholly on Boeing and they will wind up paying through the nose. As they should!


Phil

i haven't heard of anyone who thinks that

This AOA issue also proved fatal in that Air France crash out of Rio to Paris. Airbus mentality of let the airplane do EVERYTHING is the trend today. A few years ago right before I retired, there was a move in the Navy to conduct your annual Flight Check (NATOPS evaluation) in the simulator, vice taking the jet up. We fought this tooth and nail and won. A simulator simply is no substitute, yet airlines use it exclusively. There's just no substitute for real flying.

Not only that but most of the airlines flying the 737 Max didn't even have simulators.

The only additional "training" provided, in most cases, was a 1-hour iPad program that didn't even mention the MCAS.

As I understandit, shutting off the trim involved a didfffferent procedure from earlier 737s. Boeing was too eager to convince its customers that adapting to the new plane would involve no added training.

Boeing will lose lawsuits for the dead people and lawsuits from airlines who cannot operate the planes, Many airlines will cancel orders. Airbus will increase its market share. Boeing will also have to pay interst to finance all the 737s sitting around unable to be delivered for months.

Boeing will lose billions of dollars.

A lot of innocent people will get laid off and the US balance of trade will suffer.

Airbus really can't increase market share. Their comparable plane, the A320 series, is backlogged for years, just like the 737 is. They really can't absorb any new orders. Airlines order planes years in advance because they know when their current fleet has to be replaced. They can't wait several more years if they are put at the end of the Airbus order list.
Airbus has its own problems, although they aren't as serious as Boeing's. They finally pulled the plug on their moneylosing A380 double-decker. Their A350, while a great plane, is losing to the Boeing 787 in orders. Their A330neo isn't selling in the numbers that they had hoped.

This reminds me of the 1950s, where a similar "unexplained" (later defined of course) series of disasters, wiped out the British aircraft industry. It was the Comet 4 and the issue was old fashioned portholes (windows) causing explosive decompressions. They never recovered.

link

"Not only that but most of the airlines flying the 737 Max didn't even have simulators. "

One of Boeing's major sales points was that converting from the earlier 737's to the new MAX was the lack of expensive training and no new simulators were required. This promised cost savings is currently estimated to cost Boeing about $5.7 billion in lost sales, damages to customer airlines with planes sitting, litigation, etc.

statement release

- FAA Establishes Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) for Boeing 737 MAX

"The FAA is establishing a Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR). Chaired by former NTSB Chairman Chris Hart and comprised of a team
of experts from the FAA, NASA and international aviation authorities, the JATR will conduct a comprehensive review of the
certification of the automated flight control system on the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. The JATR team will evaluate aspects of the 737 MAX
automated flight control system, including its design and pilots’ interaction with the system, to determine its compliance with all
applicable regulations and to identify future enhancements that might be needed. "

put in simple terms... they will scrutinize the anticipated patchwork Boeing software updates for what they are worth.

further;
U.S. Senate Commerce Committee is investigating claims by whistleblowers that aviation safety inspectors, including some who worked
to evaluate the now-grounded Boeing 737 MAX, were not properly trained or certified.

Federal prosecutors assisted by FBI, Transportation Department inspector general’s office, and a panel - to be announced by
Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao, are also reviewing the plane’s certification.



Several air carriers may not have had their own in-house, but
Boeing Training and Professional Services had commissioned 737 Max 8 full-flight simulators
to provide training to a list of air carrier companies from around the globe.

So for air carriers that insisted on simulator time for their pilots, it was made available.

The first 737 MAX SIM was delivered by TRU to the Boeing Miami campus in 2016, certified Feb. 2017 by FAA.
Singapore campus received its first in 2017.
London-Gatwick campus in 2017,
China-Changhai campus 2017.

Canada had the first airline operated 737 MAX SIM in the world, 2017.

JorgeI: How many dual engine failures did you do on a NATOPS check in the aircraft? How about V1 cuts? As a NATOPS officer in my squadron I would answer zero.The S-3 Viking simulator was nothing like the sims used by airlines. I have flown the profile of the DC-10 crash in Iowa, a simulation of an engine failure on the tracks crossing the Atlantic where the vertical separation between aircraft is 1000', as well as a myriad of other emergencies I would never do instructing in an aircraft. The other issue is frequency of check rides. In an S-3 squadron you did 20 NATOPS checks a year. Some airlines have 1700 pilots on the seniority list. Captains go in the box twice a year and first officers once a year. The cost of doing that training in an aircraft would be staggering. Think of the space shuttle. Virtually all that training was in a simulator. Worked out pretty well except for one takeoff that could have used a do over.
I do agree that the Lion/Ethiopian crashes are a training issue. Airlines are notorious for "training by bulletin". The type rating on my license says 757/767 but I can assure you the 767 flies and taxis more like a DC-10 heavy than a 757. Management and their hired goons in the Chief Pilots office told me my license says I can fly the 767 with only a bulletin. After a quick trip in the sim with a Chief Pilot with no wide body experience dragging the mains through the dirt convinced him that over steering to maintain centerline was a little more than one sentence in a bulletin. Similar issue on the 727 Advanced. Buy some airplanes and turn them loose because the pilots flew the 722-100 and 727-200. Sat at the hold short line for 15 minutes before I remembered how the cockpit overhead lights worked because I got some time in the 727-300 at a previous job. It helps if the author of the differences bulletin has some time in both aircraft. I know of a major airline crew that flew all the way across the Pacific without a position report. International training by bulletin. I could go on but you get the picture. Boeing is a perfect example of "who you gonna believe me or your lying eyes"?

Here's a visual explanation of the issue:

https://www.vox.com/videos/2019/4/15/18306644/boeing-737-max-crash-video

This video explanation is long on emotion and blame, and short on information.

There is much more to this story than simply an MCAS failure, as the Ethiopia Airlines crash demonstrated. In that crash, the pilots were able to disable MCAS but still couldn't keep the jet in the air flying it manually.

One thing in all this is that Boeing will be borescoped from azzhole to appetite then reverse the procedure. No lube.

Exactly, which is what I expected from Vox, a notorious leftist group.

Yes, it is a complicated issue with other factors than the MCAS involved. But the video shows that just adding more software (band aids on top of band aids) to and already expanded design is not a real solution.

A little off topic, but reminds me of an old line by Red Fox. He did not like to fly because, "it might not be my time, but it could be the pilot's."

Back on topic: It only took a second years ago to figure out I should not use my cruise control when transitioning into icy conditions.

The reason the pilots couldn’t recover despite disabling the MCAS Is because by disabling the MCAS they cut power to the stabilizer and beyond about a half degree of stabilizer you can’t physically turn the wheels to adjust it manually unless you apply down rudder to unload the stabilizer which just compounds the dive issue. At their low altitude they didn’t have any altitude to work with. Maybe better trained pilots could have overcome the problem or maybe not with their low altitude. MCAS needs to be able to be disabled without cutting power to the stabilizer.

you kinda have that backwards, they didn't know exactly what to do, and there is no on/off mcas switch. mcas was deactivated when they turned off the stab switch. The two biggest mistakes made were 1) not addressing the speed of the plane, which they could have done since mcas does not affect throttle, and this was within their training, and 2) turning the stab switch back on, which then allowed mcas to crash the plane based on erroneous data from the faulty port aoa sensor.

The software changes Boeing will incorporate ( https://seekingalpha.com/article/4254678-will-boeing-737-max-flying-mid-june?dr=1 )


The Boeing software fix P12.1 makes the following changes:

1. Angle of attack data will now be taken from both sensors. The new software screens the data for inconsistencies. If they are different by a significant amount, that will appear on a cockpit's screen.
2. The force applied by MCAS is reduced, so the pilots can easily override it. After the first pilot input, the system does not repeat.
3. Pilot training on these issues will be increased and simulators will be used to train for a sensor error.
4. No hardware changes are planned. If MCAS is engaged, it will be seen on the outer two of the six full screens,

Doesn't change the inherent poor design, but it turns out that after the Indonesian crash, Boeing did publish revised procedures calling for not turning the stab trim back on in the case of continued runaway trim, so technically that is another thing the crew should have known/understood.

Yes, Western crews experiencing the same malfunction, managed to cope with it.

It would be interesting to see documentation indicating that similar events did occur and in which the worst was avoided. Also, if true, one might wonder whether this was reported as a problem to be addressed. I've seen anecdotal reports of at least one individual pilot suggesting the need for more training, but nothing official.

Yes, what guys don't understand, because they have never experienced it, is how much a specific trim setting affects angle of attack with airspeed changes. They couldn't move the stab manually because of the wing loading on it. They should have banked the aircraft 40 degrees, unloaded it, and then manually trimmed up. Repeat as necessary.

Also, they should/could have pulled the thrust back and slowed down again, accomplishing the same thing, they hit the ground at 500 kts for crying out loud....Schwarzenegger couldn't have moved the trim wheel at that speed. AT 500 knots a gnats fart could change pitch 5 degrees...VERY sensitive at those speeds.

The root of the problem is, and it's not being said, is that the MCAS, once initiated electronically and automatically, OVERRIDES ANY PILOT INPUT of the normal , electric trim switches. That is where the programming failed. So the Capt figured out that they couldn't manually trim it, again he wasn't as experienced as he could have been...decided to turn the cut-out switches back on, so he could use the electric trim, and the MCAS kicked in again and trimmed MORE nose down and they COULD NOT stop the trim motor....that's what killed them. They were accelerating and trimming forward, most likely pulling negative G's all the way to the dirt.

I don't have time to explain all the possibilities, and keep in mind, they were looking at false data on their attitude indicator and probably airspeed too...so it's not an easy task...but you have to know when to shut stuff off, look out the fricking window and fly the dam airplane....

Third world pilots don't get that experience and depth of working knowledge because of financial reasons...hell even today's western world pilots for that matter....so companies make heavily computerized FMS's and rely on automation, except when the engineers F up, and the automation goes haywire, the pilots can't adapt, improvise and overcome. Period.

Designs are compromises....yes the 737 should have be scrapped and a new aircraft clean sheeted...yes the elevator can't override the stab in certain situations, yes it should be higher off the ground, but then you have to buy all new baggage handling equipment etc., etc...........but remember regulation( ie cost) plays a huge part in design....change it too much and the training course takes pilot cost through the roof and then Hosea can't fly across the country for 69$.. thus Boeing band-aided the 737NG into the Max and here we are..

+1 and the plane was billed to only have a capt and FO, no-one else to help

reminds me of the time, when i was 12 or 13, sitting next to my bro driving along a country road, 60 or 70 mph., pre-seatbelts, he took his hands off the wheel and said he had to zip his jacket...LOL i reached over to carefully guide the car, already veering onto the shoulder, back onto the road. of course, he never took his foot off the gas pedal. after that he said, 'you just passed your first test at flight school'...LOL

Boy what a combination for a disaster. Just saying a match and a fuse! Cheers NC

I say we go back to the days of the Ford Tri-motor. No computers, just cables for control. Heck, I used to open the window and stick my head out to get some fresh air!

I note that it's been 3 weeks since the last batch of postings on this subject. The issues are still unresolved; the major one now being a lack of trust in Boeing's responses .

By now we known that the crashes were not sub-standard pilot error or training , but a series of cascading issues, including (1) making safety features optional for $80,000, (2) a trim actuator that could not be over-powered by the 2 pilots, (3) a lack of redundancy (a single-point failure design), etc. Most of all, Boeing did not inform purchasing airlines, the pilots nor, the FAA of this situation (causing a lack of faith in Boeing's responses). Here's a link to an interesting discussion of he situation: https://seekingalpha.com/article/4261666-boeing-we-it?dr=1#alt1

Let's all hope that Boeing can correct the situation and restore faith in this plane and in the US regulatory process. Boeing is a large company with many jobs depending on it.

LOTS of these airplanes flying here in the US and Europe, yet the only two crashes were with third world airlines with low PiC hours and training....right.

Seems the consensus is Boeing screwed up, in spite of that the crashes may have been avoidable by crews that should not have had to deal with the issue to begin with. The fix will be made, the planes delivered and flown, lawsuits settled, heads may roll at Boeing, bureaucrats will escape any and all consequences.

Total idiot aeronautics guy here, but one time and one time only, I saw a retired Boeing guy interviewed on Fox news basically claim that Airbus was killing Boeing with their use of a newly developed engine that got fantastic fuel savings, more than adequate power in a small light package. Boeing went with an old engine, redesigned to compete...the "Leap" series? Heavier, bigger etc. and all that required the airframe to be redesigned to accommodate it. Endless fixes had to be applied to make the damned thing fly safely. Every design change created another problem(s).
The old guy claimed Boeing should have swallowed the bitter pill and gone with the same revolutionary engine Airbus used. Anybody else hear this?

I was told by a Bombardier mechanic that Boeing was panicked about the release of the new Airbus/Bombardier jet and rushed release of the Max to compete with it. Many corners were cut to rush the date.

I believe the only 737 MAX planes flying are being flown by Boeing test pilots as part of the re-certification process; all others are grounded worldwide.

Of the 10,533 737's delivered to date, 387 are MAX's; all grounded, except for Boeing tests. This only amounts to about 3% of the delivered fleet, so it hardly "LOTS of these airplanes flying here in the US and Europe". While only 2 have crashed, others have reported to a Federal database about flight performance ( https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/13/us/pilot-complaints-boeing-737-max/index.html ).

Not making a redundant safety system (to eliminate the possibility of a single-point failure), rather making it optional, is not a measure of corporate responsibility. Boeing also made a cargo hold fire suppression system optional (also not an example of corporate responsibility). I have several former airline pilot friends (747, 767, 757 and 737 captains) who strongly criticize Boeing for these decisions.

The reason the Airbus sells is twofold: it is highly automated requiring LESS pilot training (hint: when theshit hits the fan you don't want this, witness the Air France loss on the RIO to PARIS flight, pilot INCOMPETENCE to diagnose unusual attitudes. the other are SUBSIDIES. Boeing builds a much better machine with emphasis on pilot competence.

Yes, Boeing has built superior planes which (generally) allow the pilot to override flight systems while Airbus aircraft generally allo the flight computer to have the major control. the fallacy of this approach was rather graphically demonstrated in a 1988 airshow fly-by! see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-kHa3WNerjU

Additionally, Airbus sales have greatly benefited from European government subsidies for aircraft development, while Booeing's subsidies have been generally limited to infrastructure.

Forget the fact that US based planes and the 2 that crashed have different systems, all this talk about 3rd world countries BS and simulators, it was stated over a month ago that not even US airlines have access to simulators that deal specifically with the MAX system. So the only difference, is the difference in the system itself and when the fault took place. Training had little to do with it even here in the US.

Phil

"]Forget the fact that US based planes and the 2 that crashed have different systems, ..."

I'm not sure this is correct. The redundant safety system (with the warning disagree light) was only available as part of an $80,000 option. Many low cost airlines, assured that it wasn't necessary, declined the added cost. It is interesting to note that Boeing management was unaware that unless one ordered the optional system, the light did not function; it is also noteworthy that Boeing's own test pilots were unaware of this too. (see: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/business/boeing-737-max-warning-light.html ).

This makes me wonder what was actually certified under the FAA certification process. Was the aircraft certified with both features or did Boeing certify it with one system and offer it with both? They will now make the safety feature standard. (see: https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-biz-boeing-max-737-safety-20190321-story.html )

As for US airlines, Southwest Airlines also did not order the optional system and American Airlines has said that some of their order also was not equipped.

I haven't heard of Boeing, FAA , NTSB , and US Dept. of Transport suggesting pilots are to blame,
it just seems to be gooses on the internet that persist with such.



the 'AOA Disagreement Alert' screwup - level of ignorance on Boeings part, is a shocker.

Boeing said it only discovered such after deliveries of the 737 Max had begun in 2017
[that the so-called AOA Disagree alert was optional instead of standard]

Still, Boeing did not tell US regulators for more than a year that it inadvertently made an alarm alerting pilots
to a mismatch of flight data 'optional' on 737 MAX.

Boeing waited 13 months before informing the agency November 2018 ... ie; AFTER the Lion Air crash.




Southwest the largest Boeing 737 MAX customer, says Boeing told them a standard AOA alert system had to be bought separately
to be activated, contradicting the aircraft manual.

When the new aircraft were delivered to Southwest , the “lights were depicted to us by Boeing as operable on all MAX aircraft” regardless
of purchasing the add-on, the airline operator said in a statement. The manual for the aircraft showed that as well.
thus effectively, Southwest believed they had a working AOA disagree alert, when they actually didn’t.....Boeing did not tell Southwest that
the AOA safety feature was installed but deactivated.

AND when Boeing did belatedly alert various 737 owners to the discrepancy, they did not do so to all at the same time, instead some were
told several months apart from other owners.

The AOA disagree light, was a standard issue feature on earlier models of Boeing 737.

Further note;

Boeing offered customers TWO optional paid features relating to AOA. The first was an AOA DISAGREE alert [for when the two sensors disagreed]
and the second was an INDICATOR GUAGE giving pilots the actual angle.

Southwest Airlines had the AOA alert already installed and (following the Lion Air crash) planned to add the extra angle Indicator Guage option.

American Airlines and Singapore Airlines owned SilkAir , already had both options....ie; AOA Alert and Indicator Gauge.


BOEING said in late April, that;

"Boeing did not intentionally or otherwise deactivate the AOA Disagree Alert on its MAX airplanes." ..explaining >> ...

" The AOA Disagree Alert is linked to the Indicator Guage...that is, Unless an airline also opted for the Indicator Guage,
then the AOA disagree alert was not operable"

ie;.. AOA disagree alert does not operate on 737 MAX if one does not have the necessary 'extra option' Indicator Gauge.

****

WHAT I DONT UNDERSTAND is.. if the Indicator Guage is necessary for AOA alert to work, why did Boeing sell the AOA Alert
option to customers without the necessary Indicator Guage? yet at the same time, the aircraft flight manual misleadingly states
the AOA disagree alert is operable on all 737 MAX.

Yeah but Boeing gets indirect subsidies because they can use stuff the US government pays them to develop on their commercial products. Just look at how the KC135 and the Boeing 707 resemble each other.

As far as a better plane, I dunno. Boeing's seats on narrow bodies are 1" narrower than Airbus's. In 1940 the US government did a study about railroad seats and concluded they should never be narrower than 18 inches. Boeing kept that in mind when they designed the 707. But it turned out they couldn't fly non-stop from New York to LA, with the engines available back then, unless they streamlined the plane, so they made it narrower. Today all their planes made at the Renton factory--all the 737s--have 17" seats because the factory cannot make fuselages for wider ones. I would rather fly on an A320.

Incidentally the seat pitch (room front to back) is set by the airline, not Boeing or Airbus.

Everything boeing did in this case was to make money not to save lives. They have horrible blood on their hands. They knew the aircraft was faulty in many ways. Still do.....the ceo of boeing should do a year in jail for every person he killed but he got a raise....

From teh Business times: "Former engineers who worked at Boeing have recently revealed details about the company's 737 Max development practices and how cost-cutting unfortunately sacrificed what should have been the priority: safety."

see: https://en.businesstimes.cn/article...re-details-about-737-max-development.htm

There really is not a "guage" per se. It is a small indicator that is added to one of the flight displays (think TV screen). Nothing is really added, it is just a software update to allow the flight display to show the AOA indicator.

Apparently, Boeing did not adequately label two key toggle switches that could have disabled the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) in its 737 Max aircraft, having changed them from those used on previous 737 versions. With no training, the Lion and Ethiopian Airlines pilots didn't have a clue.

https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...ckpit-limiting-ability-to-shut-off-mcas/

This whole mess just seems to keep getting deeper and sorrier.

They won't be flying anytime this year and could wind up costing Boing many billions in lost revenue not counting the for sure suits that are in their future. Never understand these type guys, cost years of lost profits trying to save a dime with no thought at all of lost lives. [bleep] will get a half billion severance package and go on to another company as if nothing ever happened, no cost to them at all.

Phil

If customer opts for an AOA Indicator it shows up as what is technically termed an electronic flight instrument,
in the glass cockpit display panel [positioned above-right of the AH.]
in the form or appearance combining both needle gauge and digital readout.

Since I have flown the MAX a bunch, I know this. I was simplifying it for non aviation types...

And for us "steam gauge" aviation types, too. Thanks.

Since the last postings, we've learned that Boeing did screw-up the design and rushed the plane's development. Even though the 737 MAX was a major re-engineered aircraft design, they sold if as only requiring a simple I-Pad tutorial training; expensive simulator training was not required. Now we find out that Boeing supplied the simulator manufacturers with incorrect handling specifications so that even those who underwent simulator training were trained wrongly.

https://simpleflying.com/boeing-737-max-simulator/

This story just never seems to end - first a rushed design, then two fatal crashes, then the design flaw comes to light, followed by Boeing's statement "We own the issue", then Boeing's CEO saying the design is sound but the pilots erred, then the design flaws come to light, then we learn they gave the wrong data specifications to the simulator manufacturers. Boeing just keeps shooting itself in the foot - again and again.

AS much a Boeing have a dug a hole for themselves, the FAA has some serious questions to answer
as to the extent they allowed Boeing to sign off on self-certification.

Word is Boeing is planning a major public image campaign hiring very high profile and very expensive retail celebrities
to reinstall confidence in the flying public...Boeing seem to be treating it like B787 lithium battery fire issue which grounded
the fleet...but MAX 8 is whole different - much more serious kettle of fish,..346 passengers died months apart in two crashes.

shows just how superficial the CEO and Boeing Executive Council really are.

..not sure Hollywood charms of say George Clooney and Julia Roberts would be enough to achieve Boeings marketing objective...
if you were George ,one would have to seriously ask how such an association could damage the Clooney brand ...




The rushed [desperate and backward] development of 737 MAX was know in the industry before such fatal crashes.

Boeing included FBW technology in B777(1994) and B787(2011), but not the 737 MAX series.

MAX retained much of the outdated aircraft systems like that in the phased out B727.

MAX does not have EICAS, (electronic engine indicating and crew alerting system) that even the B747 had.
unlike EICAS, a MAX warning light requires the crew to pull out a paper QRH handbook for instruction.

With lengthened fuselage and lower bigger engines, MAX requires much higher landing speed than 1.3x stall speed
of other jets, in order to achieve sufficient tail clearance.... the longer fuselage also effects take off angle.

with the 737 MAX 10, Boeing in development tried to employ or 'queeze on' the even larger CFM LEAP 1A engines..!!,
but reverted back to LEAP 1B, as fitted to the MAX 8.

1A engine gave better fuel efficiency-range,.. ie; which made it operationally cost effective without having to fill the aircraft
to passenger capacity, whereas the less desirable 1B has to work harder with reduced range (by 450 NM ) and operators
would have to put paying asses on all the extra 26 seats of the MAX 10 , in order to achieve similar costs per head.

Boeing extended the MAX families nose landing gear strut by about 8" in part to accomodate the much larger fan diameter engine.
The nose gear modification and the fact the LEAP B1 is already mounted higher, makes MAX engine ground clearance about equal
to the 737 NG.


737 MAX family lengths;

35.6m MAX 7
39.5m MAX 8
42.2m MAX 9
43.8m MAX 10

Pilots, were not on a need to know basis... rather than listen to more of Boeings excuses and lies. Or even the what if scenarios of those that think they know. I'll just wait for the final verdict now! If the whole story ever really does come out. Names of individuals making all those assumptions and final decisions to keep everyone else in the dark would be nice, seeing convictions would be even nicer.

But so far this article from those I've read has been the most informing:

Link

Log read for an article...

I guess now the public is supposed to trust Boeings fix for a plane that was known to be unstable in normal flight from the beginning to the faith that a single sensor and a rushed computer patch working properly.

No Thanks!


Phil

have not heard of that allegation before

A couple of current news articles:

"Boeing pressured FAA-authorized engineers on safety issues"
SEE: https://www.heraldnet.com/nation-world/boeing-pressured-faa-authorized-engineers-on-safety-testing/

"U.S. airlines expect Boeing 737 MAX jets need up to 150 hours of work before flying again" - this will be costly!
SEE: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...f-work-before-flying-again-idUSKCN1ST2BG

I assume that Boeing management (might have) learned a lesson!